I pay close attention to feedback I receive on the KVC and other analytic frameworks we are developing. Many times I make revisions based on this feedback — that’s why the KVC Handbook is now on its fourth major edition.
One of the things I’ve heard is that the KVC model is too idealistic. Even as I confess to being idealistic by nature, I think that’s a fair criticism. And thanks to your feedback I use this blog (and my Knowledge Clinics) to address things not in the current edition of the book.
In the private sector, examples of damaging deviations from the ideal are as easy to spot as this morning’s Wall Street Journal. Last month, for example, I outlined the issue of what happens when the Knowledge Value Chain is broken by chance — or corrupted by intention.
Intelligence in war
This month we examine a case that has been in play for a while, from public affairs in the US. (Though even our readers in South Africa and elsewhere should take note — things like this could happen there too!)
In general the issue is the reliability of intelligence in an active war theater — here the ongoing actions against ISIS. Does this sound familiar? It should — read my earlier post about General Michael Flynn’s criticism and subsequent reshaping of the intelligence effort in Afghanistan.
And those of you who (like me) are baby boomers will remember this issue as it played out in Viet Nam.